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Abstract 
Due to significant advances in miniaturization, low power circuit design but reasonably efficient to carry the sensitive 
information through wireless communication, wireless sensor network (WSN) have attracted attention a lot in recent years. 
ications like health monitoring, military purposes, and home automation. Since WSN 
suffer from many constraints including lower processing power, low battery life, small memory and wireless 
communication channel, security becomes the main concern to deal with such kind of networks. Due to these well accepted 
limitations, WSN is not able to deal with traditional cryptographic algorithms. This paper gives an overview of 
cryptographic frameworks designed so far and also a comparison of existing schemes is tabled. 
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1. Introduction 
The field of sensor network is well known due to its popularity in research community. It is a collection of 
thousands of self-organized sensor nodes capable of wireless communication. Since the nodes are not so 
wealthy in terms of resources, therefore complex algorithms cannot be played over it. Security is the main pre-
concern to socialize this network for common usage. For making the WSN secure, cryptography plays an 
important role. There are many algorithms proposed so far: symmetric, asymmetric and hybrid. But complex 
algorithms, which had been proposed for MANETs, are not successful over WSN. 
To design the network cryptographically (completely) secure, security must be integrated into every node
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of the network. So security should be implemented at every point of the network. Cryptography is a standard 
method to provide security in a network. But here in WSN, cryptographic algorithms should be designed such 
that it is robust in nature but does not use more memory, more power, and more energy so as the lifetime of the 
is also dependent upon the nature of the application and algorithm might be specific to the application.  
1.1. Security Requirements 
Confidentiality - Confidentiality ensures the concealment of the message from an attacker so that any 
message communicated via the sensor network remains confidential. In a WSN, the issue of confidentiality 
should address the following requirements: (i) a sensor node should not allow its readings to be accessed by its 
neighbors unless they are authorized to do so, (ii) key distribution mechanism should be extremely robust, (iii) 
public information such as sensor identities, and public keys of the nodes should also be encrypted in certain 
cases to protect against traffic analysis attacks. 
Authentication - Authentication ensures the reliability of the message by identifying its origin. By 
authenticating other nodes, cluster heads, and base stations before granting a limited resource, or revealing 
information. In a WSN, the issue of authentication should address the following requirements: (i) 
communicating node is the one that it claims to be, (ii) receiver node should verify that the received packets 
have undeniably come from the actual sender node. 
Integrity - Integrity ensures the reliability of the data and refers to the ability to confirm that a message has 
not been tampered with, altered or changed while on the network. In a WSN, the issue of integrity should 
address the following requirements: (i) only the nodes in the network should have access to the keys and only 
an assigned base station should have the privilege to change the keys. This would effectively thwart 
unauthorized nodes from obtaining knowledge about the keys used and preclude updates from external sources. 
(ii) It protects against an active, intelligent attacker who might attempt to disguise his attack as noise. 
Availability - Availability ensures the services of resources offered by the network, or by a single sensor 
node must be available whenever required. In a WSN, the issue of availability should address the following 
requirements: (i) the security mechanisms should be available all the time; a single point of failure should be 
avoided, (ii) the mechanism is used as a central access control system to ensure successful delivery of every 
message to its recipient node. 
1.2. Significance of Cryptography in Wireless Sensor Networks 
Since the popularity of WSN increasing for a wide variety of applications such as climate change, 
environmental monitoring, traffic monitoring and home automation. So to keep the WSN secure is a 
challenging task. Cryptography is one way to provide security. It can be provided through by symmetric key 
techniques, asymmetric key techniques and hash function. Since WSN are very constrained in terms of 
computing, communication and battery power, it requires a light weight cryptographic algorithm. Due to 
constraints of sensor nodes, the selection of cryptographic technique is vital in WSN. Cryptography in WSN 
can be explained in the following three aspects: symmetric, asymmetric and hash function. 
2. Types of Cryptographic Techniques 
It is important to select the most appropriate cryptographic method because all the security requirements are 
ensured by cryptography. Cryptographic methods used in WSNs should meet the constraints of sensor nodes 
and be evaluated by code size, data size, processing time, and power consumption. However, sensor nodes are 
limited in their computational and memory capabilities, so the traditional cryptographic techniques cannot be 
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simply transferred to WSNs. Consequently, to meet the above mentioned security requirements, either the 
existing techniques have to be adapted or novel techniques have to be developed. Based on the existing 
cryptographic techniques, we can classify them into three classes: symmetric cryptographic techniques, 
asymmetric cryptographic techniques and hybrid cryptographic techniques. Asymmetric cryptographic 
techniques can further be classified into three classes: RSA based techniques, ECC based techniques and 
pairing based techniques. In this section we discuss the various types of cryptographic techniques evaluated for 
wireless sensor networks until now. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Cryptographic Techniques 
2.1. Symmetric Cryptographic Techniques 
In symmetric cryptographic techniques, a single shared key is used between the two communicating nodes 
both for encryption and decryption. This key has to be kept secret in the network, which can be quite hard in 
the exposed environment where WSNs are used. Most security schemes for WSN use only symmetric 
cryptography, due to its ease of implementation on limited hardware and small energy demands, especially if 
the implementation is done in hardware to minimize performance loss. Two types of symmetric ciphers are 
used: block ciphers that work on blocks of a specific length and stream ciphers that work bitwise on the data. A 
steam cipher can be seen as a block cipher with a block length of 1 bit. 
Ganeshan et al., 2003 had presented a survey investigating the computational requirements for a number of 
popular cryptographic algorithms and presented the impact of a variety of encryption techniques for embedded 
architectures instead of general-purpose processors. Five popular encryption schemes RC4, RC5, IDEA, SHA-
1, and MD5, were evaluated on six different microprocessors ranging in word size from 8-bit (Atmel AVR) to 
16-bit (Mitsubishi M16C) to 32-bit widths (StrongARM, XScale). RC4 outperforms RC5 on encryption in low-
end processors, compared to the choice of RC5 for current sensor networks.  Law et al., 2006 evaluate a survey 
of block ciphers for WSNs. In this paper, they evaluated two symmetric key algorithms: RC5 and TEA. They 
further evaluated six block ciphers: RC5, RC6, Rijndael, MISTY1, KASUMI, and Camellia on IAR Systems
MSP430F149. Passing et al., 2006 verified with an experimental setup the runtime behaviour of cryptographic 
algorithms for WSNs including MD5, SHA-1 and AES. For hashing of arrays of different sizes MD5 
outperforms SHA-1. The required time is linearly dependent to the amount of data. The overall results show 
that the examined cryptographic algorithms need high execution times of a single AES operation on a 1kByte 
array lasted 1.67s. Fournel et al., 2007 evaluate a survey of stream ciphers for WSNs. They evaluated stream 
cipher algorithms: DRAGON, HC-256, HC-128, LEX, Phelix, Py and Pypy, Salsa20, SOSEMANUK are all 
dedicated to software uses and were originally submitted to the European Project Ecrypt in the eStream call 
(Phase 2). Choi and Song, 2006 investigated the feasibility of various cryptographic algorithms, AES, 
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Blowfish, DES, IDEA, MD5, RC4, RC5, SEED, SHA-1 and SHA-256, for their use in WSN utilising MICAz-
type motes running TinyOS. The usage of resources including memory, computation time and power for each 
cryptographic algorithm were experimentally analysed. As a result, RC4 and MD5 turned out as the most 
suitable algorithms for MICAz-type motes. Healy et al., 2008 had a look on the benefits of using hardware 
encryption for symmetric encryption to reduce encrypting costs. Thus, the authors investigated the use of the 
AES encryption module that is available on the Chipcon CC2420 transceiver chip as used for MICAz and 
TmoteSKY nodes. Three symmetric cryptographic algorithms were examined: AES, RC5 and Skipjack, AES 
outperforms better in terms of less memory use, increased execution time and less power consumption. 
2.2. Asymmetric Cryptographic Techniques 
In asymmetric cryptography, a private key can be used to decrypt and sign data while a public key can be 
used to encrypt and verify data. The private key needs to be kept confidential while the public key can be 
published freely. Asymmetric cryptography is also known as Public key cryptography. Public key cryptography 
tends to be resource intensive, as most systems are based on large integer arithmetic. For a number of years 
many researchers discarded public key cryptography as infeasible in the limited hardware used in WSN. The 
code size, data size, processing time, and power consumption make it undesirable for public key algorithm 
techniques, such as the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol or RSA signatures, to be employed in WSNs. 
There are various public key algorithms include Rabin's Scheme, Ntru-Encrypt, RSA, Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC), Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) and Identity Based Encryption. 
Malan et al., 2004 presented the first known implementation of elliptic curve cryptography over F2p for 
sensor networks based on the 8-bit, 7.3828-MHz MICA2 mote. Through analysis of their implementation for 
TinyOS of multiplication of points on elliptic curves, they argued that public-key infrastructure is viable for 
TinySec MICA2. They have implemented EccM 1.0 which is a TinyOS module 
based on code by Michael Rosing, rather it was a failure. Further, they implemented EccM 2.0 based on the 
-based jBorZoi 0.9 which was a success. EccM 2.0 
employed much less memory than EccM 1.0, its running time bests that for Diffie-Hellman based on DLP, 
using keys an order of magnitude smaller in size but no less secure. Gaubatz et al., 2004 challenged the basic 
assumptions about public key cryptography in sensor networks which are based on a traditional software based 
approach. They also proposed a custom hardware assisted public key approach which is based on optimised 
algorithms and associated parameters as well as low-power design. They compared two architectures that 
implement two different types of public key crypto-systems. The first one, Rabin's Scheme, is a specialization 
of the well-known RSA algorithm where the exponent is fixed to the value 2. The second algorithm, 
NtruEncrypt, is a public key cryptosystem where security is based on the hardness of the Shortest Vector 
Problem (SVP) in a very high dimension lattice. Gaubatz et al., 2005 improved the energy consumption of 
public key cryptography. They proposed a custom hardware assisted approach using a special purpose ultra-
low power hardware implementations of public key algorithms to make public key cryptography feasible for 
WSNs. They conclude that the use of public key cryptography results in a reduced protocol overhead, less 
packet transmissions and thus, power savings. Besides, an in-depth comparison of three unalike public key 
crypt or and 
ECDSA/ECMV. Wander et al., 2005 quantified the energy cost of authentication and key exchange based on 
public-key cryptography; RSA and ECC on an 8-bit microcontroller platform; Atmel ATmega128 processor. A 
comparison has been presented on two public-key algorithms, RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), 
and considers mutual authentication and key exchange between two untrusted parties such as two nodes in a 
wireless sensor network. The ECC-based signature is generated and verified with the Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The results have shown that ECDSA signatures are significantly cheaper than 
RSA signatures. The experiments were conducted on the Berkeley/Crossbow motes platform, specifically on 
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the Mica2dots. The implementation of RSA and ECC cryptography on Mica2 nodes further proved that a 
public key-based protocol is viable for WSNs. 
Arazi et al., 2005 described the efficiency of public-key cryptography for WSNs and the corresponding 
issues that need to be considered. Particularly, ECC is highlighted as suitable technique for WSN which 
provides a good trade-off between key size and security. Lopez, 2006 focused on the security issues by 
analysing the use of symmetric cryptography in contrast with public-key cryptography. The author also 
discussed the important role of elliptic curve cryptography in this field.  Wander et al., 2005 quantified the 
energy cost of authentication and key exchange based on public key cryptography on an 8-bit Atmel 
ATmega128L low-power microcontroller. They compared the two public key algorithms RSA and ECC, 
considering mutual authentication between two parties. The result shows that even software-based public key 
cryptography is feasible for an 8-bit microcontroller platform. However, ECC shows significant better results 
as compared to RSA in terms of reduced computation time, amount of data that needs to be stored and 
transmitted. Consequently, ECC requires less energy than RSA. Piotrowski and Peter, 2006 estimated the 
power consumption of the most common RSA and ECC operations, such as signature generation and 
verification, as well as the involved transmissions on common sensor platforms such as MICA2DOT, MICA2, 
MICAz and TelosB. The result shows that public key cryptography does not influence the sensors lifetime 
significantly, so that strong cryptography can be seen as feasible for WSNs. Batina et al., 2006 proposed a low-
cost public key cryptography scheme for sensor networks providing service such as key distribution and 
authentication. They proposed a custom hardware assisted approach to implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) in order to obtain stronger cryptography as well as to minimize the power. The low-power ECC 
processor contains a modular arithmetic logical unit (MALU) for ECC field arithmetic.  
Szczechowiak et al., 2008 presented results on implementing ECC, as well as the related emerging field of 
Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC), on two of the most popular sensor nodes MICA2 and Tmote Sky. They 
showed that ECC over prime field is not always the best option as pairings over GF(2m) seem to be more 
efficient on this type of architecture. They argued that fast pairing computation enables Identity Based 
Encryption and thus opens new ways for achieving security in sensor networks which was also argued by 
Oliveira et al., 2007. Yeh et al., 2011 proposed ECC-based user authentication protocol that resolves some 
weaknesses. 
2.3. Hybrid Cryptographic Techniques 
Symmetric and asymmetric cryptography can be applied in combination to join the advantages of both 
approaches. Pugliese and Santucci, 2008 discussed a novel hybrid cryptographic scheme for the generation of 
pairwise network topology authenticated keys (TAK) in WSNs, which is based on vector algebra in GF(q). 
Symmetric is used for ciphering and authentication, while asymmetric is used for key generation. 
3. Cryptographic Frameworks for Wireless Sensor Networks 
In this section, we discussed frameworks which are specifically designed and implemented to provide 
security to wireless sensor networks. We classify the existing frameworks according to the nature of the key 
material i.e. the shared key is private or public. We further classify asymmetric cryptographic frameworks into 
three classes as RSA based cryptographic frameworks, ECC based cryptographic frameworks and pairing based 
cryptographic frameworks. 
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3.1. Symmetric Cryptographic Frameworks 
In this subsection we discuss cryptographic frameworks which are based on single shared key both for 
encryption and decryption. Such frameworks are: SPINS, Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol 
(LEAP) and TinySec. 
 SPINS - Perrig et al., 2001 proposed a security building block, which is optimized for resource-constrained 
environments and wireless communication. It based on two secure building blocks: SNEP (Secure Network 
Encryption Protocol) -tolerant 
Authentication Protocol). SNEP provides the data confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and data 
freshness with less communication cost ticated broadcast for severely 
resource-constrained environments. The scheme is resilient to node capture and possible to revoke key. But it is 
not scalable and the base station becomes the target of attacks. It does not provide a solution for denial of 
service (DoS) attacks when the malicious node keeps sending the request to negotiate a session key because 
one adversary can easily trigger a REPLAY attack and exhaust the energy in the sensor nodes. 
 Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) - Zhu et al., 2003 proposed a protocol that was 
designed to support in-network processing. The design of the protocol was based on the principle that different 
types of messages exchanged between sensor nodes have different security requirements; a single keying 
mechanism is not suitable for meeting these different security requirements. Evaluation of the code was done 
on Mica2 motes. It nclude the issues of packet loss and feedback implosion. LEAP had analysed under 
various attack models and it comes out to be very effective in defending against many sophisticated attacks 
such as HELLO Flood attack, Sybil attack, and Wormhole attack. It is based on some assumptions that a pre-
distributed key shared among all nodes will not be disclosed during the t initial time units of the network 
operation. And once this key is erased, it cannot be recovered from memory.  
 TinySec - Karlof et al., 2004 introduced a lightweight, generic security package that developers can easily 
integrate into sensor network applications. It is the first fully-implemented protocol for link-layer cryptography 
in sensor networks. The implementation of TinySec is incorporated into the official TinyOS release. It includes 
some of the trade-offs between performance, transparency, and cryptographic security and a design is based on 
the needs of applications in the sensor network space. Bandwidth, latency, and energy costs of TinySec are low 
for sensor network applications. TinySec is easily extensible and has been incorporated into higher level 
protocols. 
3.2. Asymmetric Cryptographic Frameworks 
In this subsection, we discuss cryptographic frameworks, which are based on two shared keys, private key 
for encryption and public key for decryption. Asymmetric cryptographic frameworks are further classified as 
RSA based, ECC based and Pairing based cryptographic frameworks. 
3.2.1 RSA Based cryptographic frameworks 
In this subsection of asymmetric cryptographic frameworks, we discuss cryptographic frameworks, which 
uses RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) algorithm for the security measures. RSA is computationally intensive and 
usually execute thousands or even millions of multiplication instructions to perform a single-security operation. 
The number of clock cycles required to perform a multiplication instruction primarily determines a 
. Carman et al., 2000 found that it usually takes a 
microprocessor thousands of nano-joules to do a simple multiplication function with a 128-bit result.  
 TinyPK - Watro et al., 2004 have described the design and implementation of public-key-based protocols; 
that allow authentication and key agreement between a sensor network and a third party as well as between two 
sensor networks. TinyPK incorporating the use of TinySec provides the functionality needed for a mote and a 
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third-party to mutually authenticate to each other and to communicate securely. TinyPK is based on the well-
known RSA cryptosystem, using e=3 as the public exponent.  
3.2.2 ECC Based cryptographic frameworks 
In this subsection of asymmetric cryptographic frameworks, we discuss cryptographic frameworks, which 
uses ECC (Elliptical Curve Cryptography) algorithm for the security measures. The security of ECC is based 
on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which the cryptographic community regards as much more 
difficult than the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems that underlie the conventional Rivest-
Shamir-Adelman (RSA) and Diffie Hellman public-key algorithms. ECC has two main advantages: (1) ECC 
public keys are smaller for the same level of security as RSA or Diffic Hellman-based solutions, thus reducing 
the number of bits that need to be exchanged; and (2) ECC public-key operations require fewer computations 
than conventional public-key methods. The benefit of smaller key is that they need less storage, less bandwidth 
and, therefore, less energy, thereby reducing processing and communication overhead, which is ideal for 
energy-constrained sensor nodes.  
 TinyECC - Liu and Ning, 2008 presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of TinyECC, a 
configurable library for ECC operations in wireless sensor networks. The primary objective of TinyECC is to 
provide a ready-to-use, publicly available software package for ECC-based PKC operations that can be flexibly 
configured and integrated into sensor network applications. TinyECC provides a number of optimization 
of the optimizations have different execution time and resource consumptions, giving developers great 
flexibility in integrating TinyECC into sensor network applications.  
3.2.3 Pairing Based cryptographic frameworks 
In this subsection of asymmetric cryptographic frameworks, we discuss a cryptographic framework which 
uses pairing based cryptography for the security measures. Cryptography using Pairings (PBC) is an emerging 
field related to ECC, which has been attracting the interest of international cryptography community, since it 
enables the design of original cryptographic schemes and makes well-known cryptographic protocols more 
efficient.  
 TinyPBC - Oliveira et al., 2008 proposed TinyPBC, which is based on Multi-precision Integer and Rational 
Arithmetic C/C++ Library (MIRACL) which is a publicly available and open source library written in C. the 
authors demonstrates how sensor nodes can exchange keys in an authenticated and non-interactive way. They 
also present the fastest pairing computation on an 8-bit platform, which shows the best figures for binary field 
multiplication on an 8-bit platform. The result showed TinyPBC takes only 5.45s to compute pairings on 
ATmega128L. TinyPBC requires less than half the amount of time of the NanoECC result, which takes 10.96s 
to compute pairings. The source code is available at www.lca.ic.unicamp.br/~loliveira#tinypbc.  
 NanoPBC - Aranha et al., 2009 proposed a cryptographic library for resource-constrained devices. The 
authors implemented all big number, finite field, and elliptic curve arithmetic from scratch therefore it would 
allow to extract the most from the platform. Besides, in order to maximize speed, all time critical routines were 
implemented using Assembly. Another key factor for achieving the performance was the implementation of the 
L´opez-Dahab binary finite field multiplication. It was optimized for minimizing memory access operations, 
which are expensive on our target platform. The authors provide an in-depth description of how to implement 
pairings efficiently in resource-constrained devices and presented the fastest figures for pairing computation on 
an 8-bit platform. 
 TinyPairing - Xiong et al., 2010 proposed an efficient and lightweight pairing-based cryptographic library 
for sensors. It provides a better way to compute quickly as it consumes low memory for both the cases RAM 
and ROM by deliberately choosing some super-singular elliptic curve as the pairing group and some specific 
finite field, which defines the elliptic-curve pairing group. The source code is available at 
http://www.cs.cityu.edu.hk/ ecc/TinyPairing. The authors had evaluated the average running time. The RAM 
and ROM usage by each pairing-based scheme were obtained using the TinyOS tool-chain. 
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Table 1. Security Frameworks for Wireless Sensor Networks. 
Framework Encryption Cipher Freshness 
(CTR) 
Key 
Agreement 
Code 
Requirement 
Authentication Cost (time/energy) Support 
SPIN CTR mode RC5 (Block) Yes 
Master Key & 
Delayed 
Disclosure 
2674B CBC-MAC 7.24 ms SmartDust 
LEAP RC5 RC5 (Block) No 
Pre-deployed 
(Master 
Varaible) 
ROM: 17.9KB 
RAM: no. of 
neighbours 
CBC-MAC Variable (No. of neighbours) Mica2 
TinySec CBC mode (Optional) 
Cipher 
independent 
 
No Any 
RAM: 728B 
program space: 
7146B 
CBC-MAC 
RC5(C): 0.90ms 
Skipjack(C): 
0.38ms 
RC5(C, assembly): 
0.26ms 
Mica, Mica2, & 
Mica2Dot 
TinyPK RSA - No PK-RSA 13387B (512 bit key) 
CA-signed 
Diffie-Hellman 
public value 
3.8 s Mica1, Mica2 
TinyECC ECIES - No ECDH 20818B (micaz) ECDSA 20266.47ms / 486.4 mJ (micaz) 
Mica2/MicaZ, 
TelosB/Tmote 
Sky, BSNV3, & 
Imote2 
TinyPBC PBC - No ID-NIKDS 
Stack: 2,867B 
RAM: 368B 
ROM: 47,948B 
ID-NIKDS 5.45s (pairing computation) Mica2 & MicaZ 
NanoPBC - - - - - - - MicaZ 
TinyPairing PBC - No - RAM: 392B ROM: 21,742B - 21.95 s 
MICA family, 
Telos, eyesIFX, 
 
SCUR Rabbit 
Rabbit 
(Stream) 
(128bit) 
Yes Pre-Deployed key - - - - 
MASA - - No - - - - - 
SecFleck RSA 
RSA 
(Block) 
(2048 bit) 
& XTEA 
(128 bit) 
No - 
RAM: 52B 
Program space: 
1,082B 
RSA 
RSA (s/w): 
219,730 μ s / 
7,030.0 J 
RSA (h/w): 27 s / 
5.4 J 
XTEA (s/w): 
18 s / 0.6 J 
Fleck sensor 
node 
3.3. Hybrid Cryptographic Frameworks 
In this subsection, we discuss cryptographic frameworks, which are based on the combination of two 
approaches; symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography. In 2011, Jailin, 2011 published a novel 
scheme known as Dynamically Secured Authenticated and Aggregation scheme (DSAA), which is a 
combination of public and symmetric key cryptography, leads to increase in security, computational speed as 
well as reduces memory usage. 
 SCUR - Tahir et al., 2008 proposed a Lightweight Encryption Mechanism based on the Rabbit stream 
cipher for providing confidentiality in Wireless Sensor Networks. It fulfils both requirements of security as 
well as energy efficiency. The objective of the SCUR is to minimize cost-effect of the following while 
maintaining required levels of security: (1) Communication overhead, in case of communicating the encrypted 
pack fetime. (3) Utilized key 
space. 
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 MASA - Alzaid et al., 2008 proposed a security system known as MASA (Mixture of Asymmetric and 
Symmetric Approaches) to provide end-to-end data security for wireless sensor networks. It is based on the 
concept of virtual geographic grid wherein the entire terrain is broken down into smaller regions called cells. 
Each sensor carries two types of keys, asymmetric and symmetric. MASA uses the private key to sign a hashed 
event notification to provide confidentiality, authenticity, and data integrity. The symmetric key is used to 
authenticate the event notification within its cell. 
 SecFleck - Hu et al., 2009 described the design and implementation of a public-key platform. It is based on 
a commodity Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip that extends the capability of a standard node. SecFleck 
chooses XTEA symmetric key cryptography because of its small RAM footprint, which makes it a good 
candidate for tiny sensor devices that typically have less than 10 KB RAM. XTEA can be used in an output 
feedback mode to encrypt or decry  had discussed the performance of the 
secFleck platform in terms of computation time, energy consumption, and financial cost. 
4. Conclusion 
The wireless sensor networks continue to grow and become widely used in many applications. So, the need for 
security becomes vital. However, the wireless sensor network suffers from many constraints such as limited 
energy, processing capability, and storage capacity, etc. Consequently, many innovative security protocols and 
techniques have been developed to meet this challenge. There are many ways to provide security, one is 
cryptography. Selecting the appropriate cryptography method for sensor nodes is fundamental to provide 
security services in WSNs. In this paper, we present an analysis of cryptographic frameworks designed so far. 
Also a comparison of proposed schemes is presented. Table 1 presents the various frameworks for different 
parameters like encryption, ciphering, freshness, key agreement, code requirement, authentication, cost and 
which mote supports this framework. This comparison chart might be helpful for research community and 
might provide a future direction to them also. 
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